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Maximizing Conservation and In-Kind Cost Share: Applying Goal Programming to Forest Protection
Conservation continues to be a major policy objective in the United States and internationally.
Examples of programs which have been implemented to achieve conservation objectives include Frequently, these conservation programs involve some type of in-kind cost share or matching funds component where one program seeks to leverage additional resources from partner agencies, organizations, or individuals to achieve their conservation objectives (Kotani, Messer, and Schulze, 2010) . While researchers have long advocated for the inclusion of costs as part of the selection process through either benefit-cost targeting (Babcock et al. 1997) or integer programming (Underhill 1994) , the literature has not addressed issues around how to best incorporate in-kind cost sharing from partners into the selection process. While in-kind cost share contributions are implicitly accounted for through the lower project costs facing the funding organization, this fails to take full advantage of the additional information potentially provided by the size of the in-kind cost share, such as the level of commitment of the partner organization and the political benefits of being able to use program funds to leverage resources from other organizations, agencies, and individuals. This research addresses this potential concern by developing a two-and three-dimensional Goal Programming (GP) model that seeks to optimize both conservation outcomes and partner in-kind cost share contributions. This model is applied to the 2008 applicants to the U.S. Forest Service's Forest Legacy Program (FLP), the largest single program dedicated to preserving productive forest land in the United States.
Results from the models show that GP offers results that are superior to the program's current selection mechanism and can also yield cost-effective outcomes that may be more practical than traditional optimization approaches so that they could be more attractive for adoption for program managers.
Literature Review
In spite of the substantial amount of money spent on land conservation programs, most conservation programs are typically faced with more potential projects than they are able to fund.
A vast body of economic literature has grown up around conservation programs aiming to evaluate the efficiency achieved with the vast public and private resources invested into these programs. It has been widely acknowledged that the selection methods typically employed by land conservation programs are sub-optimal. As part of the selection process, programs frequently assign parcels with scores based on a variety of scoring systems, such as ratings from expert panels, standardized scoring system such as the Natural Resource Conservation Service's Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA) score for agricultural land, or the Environmental Benefit Index (EBI) originally designed for CRP. These parcel-specific scores are then used by the selection mechanism, typically a Benefit Targeting (BT) algorithm, which is essentially a greedy algorithm where projects are funded from highest to lowest benefit score until funds are exhausted. This approach has been subject to substantial criticism as being very inefficient, and it has been repeatedly proposed that adopting alternative mathematical optimization methods would lead to superior outcomes (for example, Babcock, et al., 1997; Polasky, et al., 2001; Wu, et al., 2000) .
One alternative to BT is Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). With CEA projects are ranked in terms of environmental benefits achieved per dollars spent on the project. These cost effectiveness ratios are then ranked and projects selected by highest ratio until funds are exhausted. CEA performs quite well as compared to BT and are easy to implement, but can still achieve suboptimal results under certain circumstances (Messer 2006 (Kaiser and Messer, 2010) .
Researchers have speculated about the lack of adoption of cost-effective and optimization techniques (i.e. Prendergast, et al., 1999; Pressey and Cowling, 2002) . For example, Prendergast, et al (1999) , as the result of an informal interviewing process with a wide sample of ecologists and land managers, identified three main barriers for adoption: lack of knowledge, lack of resources, and real or perceived shortcomings in the methods. These authors conclude that ultimately for conservation optimization to be widely adopted more work needs to be done to cater research to the needs of real life conservation practice. A recent survey of Maryland county level conservation program administrators suggested that managers not only lacked knowledge of BLP and CEA, but managers also reported not considering cost to be a major priority in the selection process and lacking incentives that would lead them to adopt it with their program (Chen 2010).
Another possible explanation for this lack of adoption is that managers need to be able to consider numerous political and strategic objectives in their decision making process. Their duties include not merely maximizing benefit scores, but also defending the "value" achieved from donor, funding agency, or tax payers' money, ensuring that applicants get a fair deal from a transparent decision mechanism, and distributing funds in a manner perceived as equitable. BLP is unable to clearly address many of these duties. These can be thought of as secondary or operational objectives that do not immediately impact the primary goal of protecting high quality land but still may be important factors in the decision making process. One way to incorporated these into the problem is as constraints, but this offers little ability to consider sensitivity or alternatives to the single solution provided. This is the basis of the appraoch used in Önal et al.
(1998) which considers both environmental and equity concerns for watershed management using a mathematical programming model. This model maximizes total profit across a watershed with a chance constraint on chemical runoff levels to take into account the stochastic nature of rainfall, and a constraint on the equity of program impact as measured by an index measurement of deviation from a uniform loss sharing level. These constraints are varied to examine the tradeoff between income, pollution, and equity losses.
A second option is to format the problem as a GP problem with these secondary objectives included as weighted goals. There have been several applications of GP in this field, including balancing economic and biological objectives over short term and long term time frames in fishery management (Drynan and Sandiford, 1985; Mardle and Pascoe, 2000; Mardle et al., 2002) optimizing environmental, social, and economic goals in energy production (Silva and Nakata, 2009) ; and the management of public water resources (Neely et al., 1977; Ballestero et al., 2002) . Önal (1997) considers an approach similar to GP in forest management. A model is employed which, instead of minimizing deviations froma goal as is done in GP, uses constrained deviations from a goal to maximize discounted future harvest value while maintaining a minimum value of a species diversity index. To our knowledge GP has not proposed in the planning of land conservation decisions.
In-kind cost sharing is an example of a secondary objective. According to Kathryn Conant, National Forest Legacy Program Manager, the US Forest Service is interested in approaches that could both maximize forest benefits and get the most from leveraged partner cost sharing funds (Conant 2008 Several justifications are typically offered for requiring some sort of in-kind costs share in the selection mechanism for conservation programs. A primary justification is that by asking applicants to commit to pay for some of the costs themselves, this ensures that applicants are committed to the project and consider it worth the effort to conserve. In other words, the applicant is willing to "put their money where their mouth is" for the project. Another justification is that cost sharing helps extend the reach of the conservation program as it can be considered a type of discount on the total project price. From the point of view of the funding agency, this could mean that there would be more money available to fund additional projects and also help increase the number of projects funded with the program's funds.
In the literature, in-kind cost sharing can be considered a type of matching grant program where the granting agency agrees to pay some portion of costs up to a percentage of the total project costs. Theoretically, matching grants are seen as a mechanism to correct for externalities and spillovers in federalized agency structures. Oates (1999) points out that the local benefits from a project under consideration may not justify funding the project for the local agency.
However, the spillover benefits to other areas make it attractive to society as a whole. The matching grant offered by an outside body would represent a sort of Pigouvian subsidy to pay the local agency for the external benefits obtained in other jurisdictions. Bucovetsky et al., (1998) offers an informational argument for matching grants similar to the "money where mouth is"
justification. Ideally, a government should distribute funds to the regions which value public services the most. The matching grant severs as a mechanism to reveal the private value of funding to the applicants.
Current evidence on the effect of matching grants and cost sharing has not offered strong results. Baker et al. (1998) found that instituting a matching grant system in the Canada Assistance Plan lowered expenditures growth by 8 to 9 percentage points as provinces became responsible for a portion of program costs. Using simulations, Borge and Rattsø (2008) found that compared to block grants matching grants decrease expense, but lead to unstable service provision over time. Chernick (1995) found that the conversion from matching grants to fixed block grants by U.S. federal welfare funding programs had substantial variation across states, but generally led to a reduction in benefits. For an in depth discussion of matching grants and their implementation see Boadway and Shah (2007) .
In the following section we develop a GP model which incorporates in-kind cost share as a secondary objective. Following that we apply this weighting scheme to the 2008 project set for the USDA's Forest Legacy Program.
Model Development
The basic BLP program that seeks to maximize environmental benefits, B * :
where x i is a binary variable indicating whether project i is chosen, b i represents the environmental benefit score as determined by the Forest Legacy expert panel, and p i the funding request for project i. T is the total budget available for the selection program for the year.
Similarly a BLP program can be set-up to maximize the amount of in-kind cost share cost share, C*:
s.t.:
A dual objective (two-dimensional) GP model can be developed as an extension of these two problems as the set-up to minimize a weighted sum of percent deviations from the maximum feasible value of in-kind cost share, C*, and environmental benefits, B * . Using these two extremes as targets, the GP problem can be set up and then the weighting between the two can be varied parametrically to examine the tradeoffs. This problem is stated as follows:
s.t.: In the objective function, the negative deviations are divided by the target value so that each represents a percentage deviation, and thus are of comparable magnitudes. The objective is to minimize the total deviations from the joint optima based on the priority weighting. The weighting factor, λ, can be varied parametrically from 0 to 1. This represents the percentage of priority that is given to in-kind costs, such that when λ is 0, 100% of the priority will be given to maximizing environmental benefits and when λ is 1, 100% of the priority will be given to maximizing in-kind cost share. Thus when λ is 0.3, then 30% of the weight will be on in-kind cost share and 70% will be on environmental benefits.
As will be discussed below in the result section, the model can be expanded to consider more than two objectives. Since managers of conservation programs typically are concerned about a range of objective which may have differing degrees of exclusivity, below we develop a three-dimensional model that incorporates total environmental benefits, in-kind cost share, and the total amount of acreage preserved. Table 2 . The increase offered by BLP represents a 120% increase in environmental benefits achieved over BT and 155% increase in the number of projects funded.
This substantial improvement should be attractive to the program managers; however we also see a 53% decrease in in-kind cost share contributions and a 56% decrease in the number of acres protected. While these factors are external to the primary objective of the program this might still be a cause for concern, especially considering that there are no other options offered.
In order to explore what other options are available consider the results of the GP method, varying λ from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1. The results of this are displayed in Table 3 and Figure 1 . Starting from the BLP solution shown in the upper-left corner of Figure 1 (or λ = 0 in the GP context), as the priority of in-kind cost sharing in the decision process is increased with increases in λ there are large improvements at relatively little cost in terms of environmental benefits. For example by moving from λ = 0.0 to λ = 0.2, the program could increase its in-kind cost share by 82% (from $46.5 million to $84.6 million) while only decreasing environmental benefits by less than 3% (from 3,024 to 2,937). Interestingly, if the program manager also cared about the number of acres protected then a good result might be λ = 0.3. In this case, there would be a 127% increase in in-kind cost share (from $46.5 million to $105.8 million) and a 91% increase in total acres protected (from 100,975 acres to 193,120 acres), with only a 9% decrease in total environmental benefits (from 3,023 to 2,936). Table 4 and Figure 2 show the results of the GP model which has been extended to include total number of acres protected as a third objective. The full set of solutions is quite large, so is not included. As might be expected the set shown in Figure 2 appears to represent a convex hull. This is not precisely the case as the full set of solutions is not continuous, but still represents a decreasing return relationship. It should also be noted that out of the 121 weighting schemes that were considered there were only 32 unique solutions. Solutions that appear multiple times in the set suggest robustness to preference weightings so might be attractive to program managers. Depending upon the preferences of the program administrators, this analysis reveals a number of attractive sets. For instance, the solution yields zhigh aggregate environmental score of 2,561 (84.6 of the maximum possible) and in-kind cost share of $110,486,751 (90.0% of the maximum possible), while delivering 81.1% of the highest possible number of acres (243, 799) identified in these solutions.
Conclusion
Optimization techniques have been frequently proposed to improve the performance of land conservation programs. There has been resistance to these by the conservation profession. One of the reasons for this may be that standard optimization techniques are one-dimensional. This paper outlines two-and three-dimensional models that uses Goal Programming (GP) to consider the tradeoffs between environmental benefits and in-kind cost sharing in conservation programs.
By applying this approach to the Forest Legacy Program, this research shows with a twodimensional model that program managers can achieve substantially better results by considering such tradeoffs. For instance, by moving from a Binary Linear Program to a more flexible GP format, the US Forest Service's Forest Legacy Program can achieve a 127% gain in in-kind cost share at only a 9% cost in benefits. Alternatively, by considering a three-dimensional ,model, a solution can be identified that achieves over 80% of the maximum levels of environmental benefits, in-kind cost share, and acres. Thus by using GP, program managers can have more flexibility in knowledgably selecting projects based on their priorities.
A potential limitation of including in-kind cost sharing in the decision process is that partner cost sharing can be implicitly integrated into the decision process in so far as it lowers the total amount that the funding agency is asked to pay. Assuming that the funding agency incorporates a notion of value into the decision mechanism through, for instance, cost-benefit ranking or budget constrained maximization, the use of in-kind cost sharing can be thought of as incorporating an element of a "discount auction" where applicants' bids are ranked in terms of the largest discount offered. An example of this type of scheme used by the Delaware Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, which select which parcels to protect based on the landowner's discount offer, where the higher-discounted offers are selected ahead of lowerdiscounted offers, without regard to the quality of the land parcel (Messer and Allen, 2010) .
Even though the inclusion of in-kind cost sharing to the objective function of a constrained optimization problem may appear redundant, program managers may find two attractive reasons of this approach. One is political; by achieving increased in-kind cost share contributions, a greater amount of total value can be achieved per dollar spent by the agency. A second reason is that by explicitly including in-kind cost-share in the decision mechanism applicants will have a clear incentive to offer a larger in-kind cost-share. Whether applicants would actually raise their cost-share in response to increasing the likelihood of being selected is an area of potential research and might be a good place to apply experimental economics techniques.
Underhill, L.G. (1994) . Optimal and suboptimal reserve selection algorithms. Biological Conservation 70, 85-87. iii Note that as the number of objectives increases constructing a systematic weighting scheme becomes rather complex and the solutions set is less amenable to visual representation. None the less, the technique can still be useful to explore alternate solutions and the effects of changing prioritization schemes.
